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After twenty years of operation, the Thai Constitutional Court has finally got its first statute
that lays out details of procedural rules. The Organic Act on the Procedure of the
Constitutional Court B.E. 2561 (2018) is long overdue. A decade of political chaos had
prevented the Parliament from passing the law until the military took power in 2014. The
junta-appointed National Legislative Assembly expected it to facilitate the Court through the
foreseeably turbulent future. Ironically, turbulences might come from the law itself.
Section 38 authorizes the Court to upkeep the order of the trial and, if necessary, the Court
may order an individual or a group to act, or refrain from committing a specific act, so the
trial could proceed in an orderly and timely manner. Violation of the law can result in either
a reprimand, an expulsion from the Court, or up to a month of imprisonment. The
exemption is that if a person who criticizes a decision in good faith and a polite manner, that
act will not be considered a contempt of court.
Prior to Section 38, the Constitutional Court judges had been protected by the defamation
law and, if a crime was done via computer, the computer crime act. When its former staff
released damaging video clips of judges being lobbied in a high-profile case, or of judges
discussing about rigging an examination to the Court’s Office for their children, the Court
exercised these laws to block public access to these clips and prosecuted its disgruntled
employee. But these laws required formal criminal trial. In contrary, Section 38 rested the
matter in the Court’s hand. It is faster and completely under the Court’s own discretion, an
extra layer to protect the Court from undue attacks.
Contempt of court is not unheard of. The Court of Justice enjoys a similar protection, which
is necessary for preserving integrity and enabling it to hear a case. But Section 38 is
different. It actually criminalizes two behaviours: first, obstruction of a trial, and second,
criticizing the Court. The first offence is normal. It is the second crime that concerns the
public. Political context is needed in order to understand why this section is so
controversial.
A powerful player
Since its establishment in 1998, the Constitutional Court of Thailand has witnessed its high,
and low. The Court showed a promising start when it invalidated a few archaic laws on
ground of equality and freedom, as well as banishment of corrupt politicians. But it proved
too moderate and slow to scrutinize the corruptions and abuses of power of the
businessman-cum-prime minister, Thaksin Shinwatra. It was even accused of being
tampered by the notorious PM. Its dwindling credit led to a temporary disband during the
2006 coup, possibly the lowest point in the history. But when the Court resumed in 2007,
new judges were picked from conservatives who allegedly sympathized with the anti-
Thaksin camp. Since then, the Court aggressively exercised judicial review and asserted its
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authority into politics, the phenomenon known as judicial activism. This radical stance
polarized public opinion. Some praised the heavy-handed approach, which they believe
would discipline evil politicians, while others feared that the separation of power and
neutrality were lost. Only Thaksin’s men got punished and his enemies were always
acquitted. Nevertheless, all agreed that the Court became a powerful player, ultimately a
game-changer. Decisions to disqualify a PM, or dissolve the government party, or block
important policies, abruptly tilted the playing field in favour of the opposition. Decisions
become no less important than an election in forming or sabotaging a government. The
latest was a series high-profile cases that eventually created a power vacuum, paving the
way for the 2014 coup. The Court has been idle under the dictatorship, but judicial activism
is still much alive. The Court has earned trust from the anti-Thaksin party to be appointed
the constitutional arbiter. Under the 2017 Constitution, the jurisdiction has significantly
expanded, invading into discretion of the executive, e.g. enforcing policies set out by the
constitution. Also, the Organic Act permits the Court to exercise more discretion in
determining the admissibility of evidence. It may allow evidence that is unlawfully obtained
or reject some evidence on ground of national security.
Despite broad powers, the Court is subject to virtually no check. The Court’s impunity
stems from both constitutional design and the reality of Thai politics. The Constitution
emphasizes the judiciary’s independence. Its selection, salary, and budget are immune
from political oversight. Although a judge may be disqualified if he is convicted of a serious
crime, or impeached by three-fifth of the Senate, the chance is highly unlikely. The judiciary,
watchdog agencies, and the Senate are long dominated by a small band of conservative
elites who would refuse to investigate, convict, and remove their own peers. Within the
Court, there is no appellate body to review a decision. Thus, holding the Court accountable
is difficult.
But great power cannot go unchecked. Many decisions are, at best, controversial, while
others are wrong. In 2001, Thaksin was acquitted because the Court miscalculated the
majority votes. The decision was later described as the root of all subsequent troubles. In a
rush to end the 2008 siege of international airports by anti-Thaksin demonstrators, the
Court skipped the final presentation from the defendant and dissolved Thaksin’s proxy, the
People’s Power Party. It bypassed the procedure described in Section 68 of the 2007
Constitution and accepted the constitution amendment case directly petitioned to it. Later, it
nullified a 2014 general election, blaming the government for failing to prevent violence
from anti-Thaksin mobs. It went on to remove PM Yingluck Shinawatra even when she
dissolved the House. It endorsed the broad and ambiguous Referendum Act that silenced
opponents of the junta, helping it to win in the constitutional referendum of 2016. These are
just a few examples. In any case, these mistakes and controversies deserve thorough
discussion, even criticism. The more the Court is involved in politics, the more crucial it
must be subject to critique from laypersons, politicians, journalists, or scholars. Public
criticism serves as a mechanism to hold the Court accountable, regardless of how weak
this mechanism is. Without check, great power quickly descends into arbitrariness.
The law is not draconian, for it exempts criticism in good faith and a polite manner. But
these terms are vague. It is doubtful that, given the Court’s highly polarized performance,
application of the law will be just and fair. One harsh sentence on a scholar is enough to
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send a chilling effect to the whole community, effectively muting opinions.
In recent years, even the Court of Justice has increasingly used the charge in political
cases. In these cases, disorder is unavoidable. Emotion is high. Cheering crowds, angry
mob, and an army of reporters come to observe the life and death of their political leaders,
a reminder of why contempt of court is necessary. But as more anti-junta activists are given
long jail terms and heavy fines for trivial activities, such as holding a press conference or
symbolically expressing dissent within the vicinity of the court, people begin to question if
the offence is being abused to silence critics of the justice system, and the military regime.
The Constitutional Court is assigned the duty of upholding democracy and the rule of law.
But democracy needs freedom of expression and the check-and-balance. The rule of law
means a fair trial by an impartial court. Impartiality, fairness, and free speech have already
been scarce and fragile. Section 38 would further inflame the problem.
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